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I. Facts
On August 12, 1992, Charles Walker, his girlfriend Pamela Haizlip, and
fellow housing project residents Jesse Thompson, Rashar Darden, Antonio
Wrenn, Sabrina Wilson, and Nicki Summers gathered at Summers's apartment,
located directly across the parking lot from Haizlip's apartment. Walker lived
with Haizlip in her apartment. Thompson, Wrenn, and Darden worked for
Walker selling drugs. The night before, Tito Davidson had allegedly tried to rob
Haizlip's apartment, where she typically kept $4,000-$5,000 in drug money.'
While the group discussed the attempted robbery, Wrenn noticed Davidson
nearby. Walker directed Haizlip to lure Davidson to her apartment. Walker told
Haizlip that Thompson and Darden were going to beat up Davidson. After
Haizlip left the apartment, Walker pulled out a gun and loaded it. According to
Wilson and Darden, Walker said he was going to kill Davidson. Walker, Thomp-
son, and Darden, armed with his own gun, then walked to Haizlip's apartment.
After Haizlip had lured Davidson to her apartment and the three men had
arrived, Haizlip returned to Summers's apartment.-
Walker and Darden ordered Davidson to the floor at gunpoint and bound
his hands. Walker then asked whether Davidson had tried to rob him. When
Davidson denied any knowledge of a robbery, Walker taped his mouth shut,
struck him three times in the kneecaps with a hammer, handed his gun to
Thompson, and left the apartment. Thompson sliced Davidson's throat with a
Ginsu knife and shot Davidson in the finger and arm with Walker's gun. Darden
also shot Davidson with his own gun.3
During this time, Walker moved back and forth between Haizlip's apart-
ment and Summers's apartment.4 After some time, Darden went to Walker, now
at Summers's apartment, to explain that, "[Davidson] ain't dying."' According
to Darden, he and Walker then returned to Haizlip's apartment where Walker
shot Davidson in the neck.6 The men purchased trash bags and cleaning sup-








plies, disposed of the body, and cleaned Haizlip's apartment.7 Walker, Haizlip,
Wrenn, Darden, and Thompson were all arrested for Davidson's murder.'
While in jail, Haizlip wrote letters to Walker in which she indicated she had
lied when she told police that Walker murdered Davidson.9 In one letter, she
commented that "[y]ou must have had a bad past, Charles.""0 At Walker's trial,
Haizlip testified for the State. On cross examination, defense counsel, seeking
to impeach Haizlip's testimony, questioned Haizlip about the letters and then
entered them into evidence.12 On redirect, the Government asked Haizlip about
the letter in which she referred to Walker's bad past. 3 Haizlip answered that the
comment referred to an attempted murder charge about which Walker had
previously told her. 4
The state trial judge instructed the jury on first-degree murder, and the jury
returned a guilty verdict. 5 A separate sentencing hearing followed. 6 Walker's
counsel did not raise as a non-statutory mitigating factor the question of whether
Walker actually fired the fatal shot.'7 The judge instructed the jury that "all of the
evidence relevant to your recommendation has been presented .... All of the
evidence which you hear in botbpbases of the case is competent for your consider-
ation in recommending punishment."'" The sentencing form asked specifically
whether Walker fired the fatal shot.' The jury answered "no" but found that
Walker intended to kill the victim while acting in concert with others. ' After
7. [Walker, 87 Fed. Appx. at 837-38.





13. Walker, 87 Fed. Appx. at 838.
14. Id.
15. Id
16. Id The sentencing proceeding for defendants convicted of capital felonies in North
Carolina is governed by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (2003). The statute provides for a separate
sentencing proceeding at which "[e]vidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems
relevant to sentence." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(a)(3). Such evidence "may include matters
relating to any of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances enumerated" in the statute and
further, "[a]ny evidence which the court deems to have probative value may be received." Id.
17. Walker, 87 Fed. Appx. at 838.
18. Id (emphasis added); see N.C. GEN. STAr. § 15A-2000(b) (stating that in cases for which
the death penalty may be authorized, the judge must include in his jury instructions that the jury
"must consider any aggravating circumstance or circumstances or mitigating circumstance or
circumstances" from the statutorily enumerated circumstances and must "furnish to the jury a
written list of issues relating to such aggravating or mitigating circumstance or circumstances").
19. Walker, 87 Fed. Appx. at 838.
20. Id.
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weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors, the jury sentenced Walker to
death.2 '
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the
sentence of death, and the United States Supreme Court denied Walker's petition
for a writ of certiorari.2 After exhausting North Carolina postconviction proce-
dures, Walker filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States
District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina.23 The district court
denied Walker relief, and he sought a certificate of appealability ("COA") from
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.24
II. Holng
The Fourth Circuit granted Walker a COA on the issues he presented but
denied his claims on the merits.2 The court held that the state trial court did not
unreasonably apply Beck v. Alabama26 when it refused to give a second-degree
murder instruction based upon the evidence introduced at trial.27 In addition, the
court determined that the state court did not unreasonably apply Bradv v.
Maglan2" when it refused to order a new trial based on the prosecution's failure
21. Id. The jury found as aggravating circumstances that Walker had been previously
convicted of a violent felony and that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. State
v. Walker, 469 S.E.2d 919, 924 (N.C. 1996). The jury also found eight mitigating circumstances,
including Walker's mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the crime. Id; see N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-2000(e), (f) (listing the aggravating and mitigating factors that may be considered by
the jury in determining a capital defendant's sentence); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(c)(3) (provid-
ing that the jury may recommend death when "the mitigating circumstance or circumstances are
insufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances found").
22. Walker, 87 Fed. Appx. at 838; Walker v. North Carolina, 519 U.S. 901 (1996) (mem.).
23. Walker, 87 Fed. Appx. at 838; see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2000) (oudining the standard of
review for a federal court hearing a habeas petition arising from a state proceeding on the merits;
part of AEDPA).
24. Walker, 87 Fed. Appx. at 837; see 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(2000) (providing that "[u]nless
a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court
of appeals"; part of AEDPA); 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (stating that for a certificate of appealability
to issue, the applicant must make a "substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right"; part
of AEDPA).
25. Walker, 87 Fed. Appx. at 837.
26. 447 U.S. 625 (1980).
27. Walker, 87 Fed. Appx. at 839; see Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637-38 (1980) (finding
that Alabama was constitutionally prohibited from withdrawing a lesser-included offense instruction
from a capital jury when such withdrawal enhanced the risk of an unwarranted conviction).
28. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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to disclose a witness statement29 Finally, the court concluded that Walker was
not denied effective assistance of counsel.3°
III. Anasis
A. Beck Claim
Walker argued that the state trial court should have instructed the jury on
second-degree murder and that its failure to do so resulted in an unreasonable
application of the rule articulated in Beck.3 To address Walker's first claim, the
Fourth Circuit relied on Hopper P. Evan?2 and looked to North Carolina law to
determine what evidence would warrant a jury instruction on the lesser-included
offense of second-degree murder.3 3 In North Carolina, "first-degree murder is
'the unlawful killing of a human being with malice, premeditation, and delibera-
tion.' "' Premeditation requires the formation of the specific intent to kill,
however briefly, before the act of murder.35 Deliberation means the formation
of the above intent in a cool state of blood and not in the heat of passion.
36
Second-degree murder requires malice but not premeditation or deliberation.37
29. Walker, 87 Fed. Appx. at 841; see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,87 (1963) (holding that
the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused, upon request, violates due
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment). SeegeneralbJannice Joseph,
The New Russian Roulette: Brady Retisited, 17 CAP. DEF.J. 33 (2004) (discussing the effects of allowing
prosecutors to make final determinations on the materiality of exculpatory evidence).
30. Walker, 87 Fed. Appx. at 841; see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687-96 (1984)
(holding that to prove ineffective assistance of counsel a defendant "must show that counsel's
performance was deficient" and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense to such a degree so "as
to deprive the defendant of a fair trial").
31. Walker, 87 Fed. Appx. at 838; see Beck, 447 U.S. at 637-38 (governing a defendant's right
to a jury instruction on a lesser-induded offense).
32. 456 U.S. 605 (1982).
33. Walker, 87 Fed. Appx. at 839; see Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 611 (1982) (concluding
that due process only requires a jury instruction on a lesser-induded offense if the evidence warrants
such an instruction).




37. Id (citing State v. Watson, 449 S.E.2d 694, 699 (N.C. 1994)). North Carolina appellate
courts recognize three kinds of malice. State v. Reynolds, 297 S.E.2d 532, 536 (N.C. 1982). The
first, express malice, connotes a positive concept of express hatred, spite, or ill-will. Id Another
kind of malice arises when an inherently dangerous act is done so recklessly and wantonly as to
manifest a disregard for human life and social duty. Id Both of these forms of malice would
support a second-degree murder conviction. Id The third kind of malice is defined as a "condition
of mind which prompts a person to take the life of another intentionally without just cause, excuse,
or justification." Id.
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After reviewing the trial record, the Fourth Circuit concluded that there
"was no evidence that Davidson's murder was committed with an intent other than
one characterized as premeditated and deliberate."3  Wilson and Darden's
statements, that Walker said he was going to kill Davidson, supported the court's
finding of premeditation and deliberation.39 Although Haizlip's testimony
suggested that Walker intended to beat up Davidson rather than kill him, the
court reconciled the conflicting statements.' The Fourth Circuit determined that
the testimony, consistent with the events of the murder, indicated Walker's intent
to both beat up and kill Davidson.4 The court also rejected Walker's contention
that the evidence was inconsistent concerning what acts Walker committed
during the course of the murder.4 2 Instead, the court concluded that any incon-
sistency did not concern whether Walker had the intent to commit first- or
second-degree murder, but only whether Walker was guilty of murdering
Davidson at all." Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit interpreted the evidence as
fully substantiating the trial court's decision and concluded that so long as the
jury believed Walker killed Davidson, premeditation was clear.'
B. Brady Claim
Walker also asserted that the North Carolina court unreasonably applied
Bradj when it declined to grant a new trial based upon the prosecution's suppres-
sion of a witness statement, which Walker contended contained exculpatory and
material evidence.4" On September 30, 1992, police recorded an oral statement
by Marquita Schofield.' According to Schofield, Thompson told her that after
the attempted robbery of Haizlip's apartment, Thompson confronted Davidson
and "bust [him] twice," meaning that Thompson shot Davidson twice. Thomp-
son apparently also told Schofield that in response to his recounting of the
38. Walker, 87 Fed. Appx. at 839 (emphasis added). The court based this determination upon
uncontroverted testimony that Walker instructed Haizlip to lure Davidson to her apartment, that
Walker took out and loaded a gun prior to walking to Haizlip's apartment, and that Darden and
Wilson heard Walker say he was going to kill Davidson. Id The court also considered the
prolonged nature of the crime and Walker's participation in the dean-up of the murder scene. Id
39. Id
40. Id at 839-40.
41. Id at 840.
42. Id
43. Id
44. Walker, 87 Fed. Appx. at 840.
45. Id; see Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (holding that the prosecution must disclose evidence
favorable to the accused if suppression of that evidence will deprive the accused of a fair trial).
46. Walker, 87 Fed. Appx. at 840.
47. Id (alteration in original).
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shooting, Walker told Thompson "he was crazy. '" On October 19, 1992,
Schofield provided police with a written statement that was substantially the same
as the first but did not include Thompson's statement that Walker told Thomp-
son he was crazy.49
At Walker's trial, the Government provided Walker with the October 19
statement only." The state trial court determined that the first statement was
"substantially consistent with and merely cumulative to" the second statement
and held that the September 30 statement was not material under Brady.51 On
appeal, Walker argued that the difference between Schofield's two statements was
vital to the determination of Walker's involvement in the murder because it called
into question his specific intent to kill Davidson.1
2
The Fourth Circuit concluded that, even if the withheld statement was
favorable to Walker, the North Carolina court properly determined that the
statement's suppression did not present a reasonable probability of affecting the
jury's verdict.5 3 Given the "overwhelming weight" of the Government's evidence
of Walker's intent to kill Davidson, Thompson's subordinate position as drug
runner for Walker, and the potentially ambiguous nature of the statement that
Thompson "was crazy," the Fourth Circuit determined that the "difference
between the disclosed and undisclosed versions of Schofield's testimony could
reasonably be found to have had no impact on the outcome of the trial."'
Therefore, the court concluded that the state court decision not to order a new
trial was not an unreasonable application of Brady.5
C Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
The Fourth Circuit found no merit in Walker's first ineffective assistance of
counsel ("IAC' claim. 6 The court noted that defense counsel submitted affida-
vits attesting to their efforts to locate witnesses, including Schofield. 7 Citing
48. Id
49. Id at 840-41.
50. Id at 841.
51. Id.; see United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (holding that exculpatory
evidence withheld by the prosecution is material "if there is a reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different").
52. Walker, 87 Fed. Appx. at 841.
53. Id
54. Id The court also noted that describing someone as crazy could have alternate meanings,
including maniacal and ruthless. Id. The court then reasoned that such interpretation would be
consistent with the remainder of Thompson's statement in which Walker bragged about the






Huffington v. Nuth,58 the court determined that failure to locate witnesses after
reasonable efforts did not rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel.5 9
Finally, the court found no reasonable probability that Schofield's testimony
would have affected the outcome of the trial.' Thus, the court concluded that
Walker's first claim failed to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test.6'
In dismissing Walker's second IAC claim, the Fourth Circuit concluded that
Walker's counsel made a strategic decision to enter Haizlip's letters into
evidence.62 The letters showed that Haizlip, one of the Government's key
witnesses, had lied to police.63 The fact that one of the letters also included the
potentially damaging reference to Walker's bad past was a "strategic price" paid
by defense counsel and not the basis for a finding of ineffective assistance of
counsel.'
Finally, the court concluded that defense counsel's failure to propound, at
sentencing, the fact that Walker did not fire the fatal shot, had no reasonable
probability of affecting the outcome of the sentencing hearing.65 The court
recognized defense counsel's obligation, under Wiliams v. Taylor,' to investigate
possible mitigating factors in preparation for a capital sentencing hearing.67 The
court placed weight, however, on the fact that counsel did raise the issue of who
fired the fatal shot during the guilt phase of the trial.68 Further, the jury answered
"no" on the sentencing form as to the question of whether Walker had fired the
fatal shot.69 Because the trial judge instructed the jury to "consider any other
circumstance ... arising from the evidence which you deem to have mitigating
value," the Fourth Circuit found that defense counsel's failure explicitly to raise
at sentencing the fact that Walker did not fire the fatal shot did not deprive
58. 140 F.3d 572 (4th Cir. 1998).
59. Walker, 87 Fed. Appx. 841; see Huffington v. Nuth, 140 F.3d 572, 581 (4th Cir. 1998)
(finding that even if defense counsel's failure to contact witnesses identified by the defendant in a
capital murder case fell below the standard of objective reasonableness, the failure did not prejudice
the defendant).
60. Walker, 87 Fed. Appx. at 841. The court determined that at most, Schofield would have
reiterated the statement she gave to police. Id.
61. Id




66. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
67. Walker, 87 Fed. Appx. at 842; see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,396 (2000) (stating that
counsel's limited investigation of mitigating evidence could not be justified as a tactical decision).




Walker of a fair trial.70 Accordingly, the court concluded that Walker failed to
satisfy Stricklands prejudice prong.
7 1
IV. App#cation in Virginia
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
In North Carolina, all mitigating circumstances, both those expressly
mentioned in the statute and those offered by the defendant as having mitigating
value, must be submitted in writing to the jury upon the defendant's request.
7 2
Pursuant to this rule, Walker's counsel could have requested that the issue of
whether Walker in fact fired the fatal shot be submitted to the jury in writing as
a mitigating factor.73 However, in doing so, defense counsel would have taken
a risk.
For example, suppose that a hypothetical jury is presented with a list of
twelve possible mitigating factors for consideration. Members of the jury find
only two of those twelve factors to be substantiated by the evidence. 4 The list
no longer looks like an enumeration of possible mitigating circumstances.
Instead, the rejected factors provide positive evidence that mitigation evidence
was sparse. The lack of mitigation reinforces the defendant's culpability. A
similar concern would apply to defense counsel's decision not to raise a mitigat-
ing factor at sentencing, for example, the contention that Walker did not fire the
fatal shot. Given the evidence, defense counsel might have concluded that the
jury was unlikely to find in Walker's favor. Failure to find that Walker did not fire
the fatal shot had the potential to damage Walker's case in mitigation by provid-
ing a strong reminder to the jury that Walker in fact inflicted the lethal injury.
Virginia does not have a comparable rule requiring that mitigating circum-
stances specifically be enumerated for the jury upon defendant's request. How-
ever, the same strategic considerations apply when defense counsel determines
which and how many mitigating circumstances to present to the jury. Defense
counsel's decision not to present a non-statutory mitigator that the jury is un-
likely to find may reflect a conscious decision to focus attention on those mitigat-
ing circumstances best supported by the evidence.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See State v. Johnson, 257 S.E.2d 597,619 (N.C. 1979) (holding that all statutory and non-
statutory mitigating circumstances must, upon defendant's timely request, be submitted in writing
to the jury).
73. Id.
74. See McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 444 (1990) (invalidating North Carolina's




When, as here, the Government discloses a witness statement, the reason-
able inference to be made by defense counsel is that all favorable statements by
that witness have been produced. Logic dictates that if one of Schofield's
statements was covered by Brady, the other, substantially similar but likely more
favorable statement, was also covered by Brady. Claims under Brady may be
strengthened if defense counsel makes a specific Brady request for conflicting
witness statements and obtains a representation from the prosecution, prior to
trial, that all Brady material has been disclosed to the defense.
The Fourth Circuit rejected Walker's claim that the suppressed statement
by Schofield was material under Brady.75 Rather than giving Walker's statement
that Thompson was "crazy" its common sense meaning, for example, "you're
nuts" or "I can't believe you did that," the court substantially ignored the state-
ment as potential evidence negating Walker's intent to kill Davidson.76 The court
instead resorted to dictionary definitions of crazy, including maniacal and ruth-
less, to transform Walker's words from an expression of disbelief to affirma-
tion.77 This manipulation of language satisfied the court that Schofield's second
statement was immaterial under Brady.78 In fact, such evidence negating Walker's
intent to kill Davidson would have bolstered Walker's final claim, that under
Beck, the judge should have instructed the jury on second-degree murder.
C. Beck Claim
The Fourth Circuit held that Schofield's suppressed statement would not
have altered the jury verdict. The court applied strained reasoning when it
concluded that "as long as the jury believed that Walker killed Davidson, there
was no question but that he did it with the intent required for first-degree mur-
der."' 79 In fact Walker had pointed to inconsistent testimony regarding both the
underlying facts, i.e., whether he actually fired the fatal shot, and his intent to
commit the murder. Further, despite the fact that counsel did not propound the
issue at sentencing, the jury actually found on the sentencing form that Walker
did not fire the fatal shot.
The court's determination that the above evidence did not warrant a lesser-
included offense instruction demonstrates the difficult standard set forth in Beck
as applied in the Fourth Circuit. The test is not whether the evidence raises a
question about the defendant's guilt of the greater offense, but rather, whether
the evidence supports a conviction of the lesser offense to the exclusion of the




79. Id at 840.
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greater offense. This is consistent with the federal rule that a lesser-included
offense instruction should be given "if the evidence would permit a jury ratio-
nally to find [a defendant] guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the
greater."
80
Under Virginia case law, consistent with Beck, when the evidence in a
prosecution warrants a conviction of the crime charged, and no independent
evidence warrants a conviction for a lesser-included offense, the lesser-included
offense instruction should not be submitted to the jury.8' In other words, jury
instructions on lesser-included offenses are proper only when supported by
"more than a scintilla of evidence."' 2 Conversely, when the record includes
evidence that would support conviction for a lesser-included offense, the court
must allow the jury to consider that lesser-included offense. Therefore, defense
counsel must effectively counter evidence of premeditation and evidence of a
predicate offense in order to obtain a lesser-included offense instruction.
V. Conclusion
Walker illustrates the difficult choices faced by defense counsel when
preparing and presenting mitigation evidence. Counsel's duty to zealously
advocate on behalf of a client may or may not include strenuously arguing every
possible non-statutory mitigating circumstance. Walkeralso provides a reminder
that the prosecution effectively gets the final say regarding the materiality of
exculpatory evidence under Brady, and further, that the materiality standard can
be very difficult for a defendant to satisfy on appeal. Finally, under Beck and the
equivalent Virginia rule as applied by the Fourth Circuit, a capital defendant will
not receive a lesser-included offense instruction unless the evidence would
support a conviction of the lesser offense and an acquittal of the greater offense.
Jessica M. Tanner
80. Hopper, 456 U.S. at 612 (citing Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208 (1973)).
81. Guss v. Commonwealth, 225 S.E.2d 196, 197 (Va. 1976).
82. Commonwealth v. Donkor, 507 S.E.2d 75, 76 (Va. 1998).
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